AGREAT many people are up in arms over the ‘Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Bill’ adopted by US Congress and popularly known as the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The military has expressed reservations on some of the monitoring provisions. The opposition is gaining political mileage out of the rhetoric of national sovereignty. Columnists and analysts are weighing in with their opinions and are generally critical of the new legislation. Far from strengthening the civilian government that the bill was supposed to do, it has landed yet another crippling blow upon the government’s statesmanship and credibility. Now an explanatory note has been attached to the bill to allay the concerns voiced by the military and the opposition but the bill itself remains unchanged. The actual text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill is for the most part devoid of intellectual substance and reflects poorly on those who drafted it. It begins by reaffirming that Pakistan is “a valuable partner” and that its efforts to contain the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants has resulted in deaths of thousands of Pakistani civilian and military personnel. It recognises that the recent global economic crisis has severely damaged Pakistan’s economy while recent military operations in Swat have displaced millions. From there it waxes eloquent about “the people of Pakistan”, the need to “consolidate democracy”, promote judicial independence and the rule of law, provide modern education, madressah reform, “public-private partnerships” and “people-to-people” contact. Improving Pakistan’s anti-nuclear proliferation, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities are also listed as key priorities. In fact, there is really nothing new in all this and much of the rhetoric about democracy and development has been standard fare for over half a century. Moving right along to the authorisation of assistance for democracy and development, the president of the United States is empowered to help Pakistan democratise, capacity-build, spread economic freedom and take care of internally displaced persons. Somewhat amusingly, given the present Pakistani government’s reputation, the US will support Pakistan to establish “frameworks that promote government transparency.” Support is also to be provided for “police professionalisation”, a free media, “strengthening civil society and non-governmental organisations” and facilitating an independent judiciary. Such ‘pious’ talk is rubbish. Pakistan now has a remarkably independent judiciary in spite of the support given by the United States to the former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan’s media, which Musharraf tried to muzzle during the November 2007 Emergency, is mostly anti-American. On the other hand, Musharraf’s successor, Asif Ali Zardari is widely perceived to be pro-American. The Kerry-Lugar Bill also details the various economic and social sectors it will try to uplift. These include rural development, sustainable development, vocational training for youth, microfinance, improving health services, investing in higher education, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and “building capacity” for NGOs and civil society. Two points emerge from this section. One, our benefactors have little idea of the kind of state and society they are dealing with; second, the scope of US assistance is so broad that the allocation of $1.5 billion per year looks too small. On the security front, the purpose of the Kerry-Lugar Bill is to “help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere.” Another objective is “to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.” One can easily see how the former provision could be interpreted as an example of Indian influence in the legislation while the latter can be construed as a fairly clumsy attempt to interfere in Pakistan’s delicate civil-military relations. The Secretary of State is further empowered to launch an exchange programme for Pakistani civilian and military personnel “in order to foster mutual respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian rule of the military.” More to the point, for Fiscal Years 2010-2014 “any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.” Waivers are also attached so that the US can continue to make payments to Pakistan if the Secretary of Defence “certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interests of the United States.” It is the monitoring and reporting aspect of the Kerry-Lugar Bill that merits serious attention. The list of reporting areas for which non-military assistance is to be provided literally goes from A to Q and includes civil liberties, political rights, accountability, rule of law, control of corruption, immunisation rates, etc. The resources committed are grossly inadequate given the scope of the programme. It would have been better for the US if the resources were used to improve administration and accountability or building physical infrastructure. Pakistan is also required to “prevent attacks into neighbouring countries”, shut down alleged terrorist training camps and eliminate “safe havens.” The United States will also have to certify that the assistance provided to Pakistan is not in any way helping the recipient improve its nuclear arsenal and assess “the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control on the military.” The extent covers civilian leaders’ oversight and approval of military budgets, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, etc. The basic problem with the Kerry-Lugar Bill is that it provides too little financial assistance but spreads out that assistance over too many programmes to be effective on any particular front and delivers moral judgments about Pakistan’s domestic power structure. The bill practically ignores the general deterioration in the quality of Pakistan’s civilian bureaucracy that must be arrested if the state is to be rehabilitated and organised to do away with terrorism and extremism or if in the long run overall civilian control of the state is to be restored. It shows that even at this stage the American leadership lacks the rational will to try and comprehend the structural imperatives of societies whose cooperation it needs to prevail in its campaign in Afghanistan. At the same time it must be said that the Kerry-Lugar Bill is not a nightmarish Freddie Krueger sort of deal that some quarters are making it out to be. It may not be advisable, for instance, to take the monitoring provisions too seriously. After all, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagan certified that Pakistan was not building nuclear weapons when it very clearly was. Similarly, in the 1950s and 1960s US military assistance to Pakistan meant for containing communism was being openly used to deter India. More recently, under Musharraf, the United States waived democracy and nuclear-related sanctions and used its clout to help Pakistan reschedule its foreign debt while providing billions in military and economic assistance. The fact that Pakistani governments never made wise or effective use of the aid and the breathing space it provided and that the state apparatus has reached a point of decay where it is incapable of meaningfully benefiting from further assistance is another major consideration that any aid package needs to countenance. Without proper investment in the law and order administration and taxation and auditing machinery further assistance is likely to be stolen or wasted with a substantial chunk finding its way into the pockets of American contractors and consultants. Indeed, the Americans could learn a great deal from the Chinese about how to go about providing assistance. The Chinese provide Pakistan with less assistance than the United States but the fruits of that assistance are visible — nuclear power plants, ports, mines, highways, fighter jets, battle tanks, frigates etc. The assistance is provided with little fanfare. After all, the Chinese seek to build relationships with states, not transient regimes or governments, while Americans seem to cultivate regimes or leaders — strongmen like the Shah of Iran. The Kerry-Lugar Bill is, its proponents say, an attempt by the United States to establish a long-term partnership with Pakistan. But given the level of assistance, its wide dispersal and intrusive conditions, the effects seem likely to be negligible on the ground and politically and publicly counterproductive. The writer is a faculty member of the Department of History at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
